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Since the breakdown of Bretton Woods, a large literature has developed around the choice
of exchange rate regime. One strand, drawing on the theory of optimum currency ar-
eas, asks why countries adopt the exchange rate regime they do (see Honkapohja and
Pikkarainen 1992, Rizzo 1998, and Edwards 1999). Another explores the implications of
that choice for real and nancial variables such as interest rate volatility, business cycle
co-movements, real exchange rate variability and nancial stability (see Mussa 1986, Bax-
ter and Stockman 1989, and Hausmann, Gavin, Pages-Serra, and Stein 1989). It is fair
to say that these questions have come to constitute one of the principal preoccupations
of empirical international economists.
A limitation of the early literature is that it utilized the International Monetary Fund's
de jure classication of exchange rate regimes.1 As published in the Fund's Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, this index summarized countries'
self-reported exchange rate regimes. The problem was gaps between ocially reported and
actually prevailing exchange rate arrangements. An example is the case of a government
seeking to keep its exchange rate pegged and reporting the de jure regime accordingly but
ultimately unable or unwilling to maintain its peg.2 Alternatively, countries ocially com-
mitted to exible exchange rates might exhibit fear of oating (Calvo and Reinhart 2002);
they might intervene in the foreign exchange market to limit actual variability. Either
way, the implications for studies of choice of exchange rate regime and its consequences
are not happy.
These observations have given rise to attempts to classify countries according to actual
practice { to identify the de facto exchange rate regime { of which Bubula and  Otker-
Robe (2002), Reinhart and Rogo (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) are
prominent examples. Reinhart and Rogo (RR) divide their observations into those in
which a country has a unied exchange rate versus dual or parallel rates.3 For countries
with only ocial rates they then use statistical methods to verify the accuracy of the
de jure classication and/or place the observation into an alternative category, relying
1A minority of the literature instead utilized actual exchange rate volatility, variously measured, as a
proxy for the de facto regime (see Holden, Holden, and Suss 1979 and Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1997).
2 This is the case analyzed by Alesina and Wagner (2006).
3Recently, Bubula and  Otker-Robe's de facto classication has been extended further back to cover
the period since 1980 by Anderson (2009).
1mainly on data on exchange rate variability, variability relative to ocially-announced
bands, and observed ination. For countries with dual and parallel rates they do likewise
on the basis of the market-determined rate. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (LYS), for their
part, classify exchange rate regimes on the basis of the volatility of the nominal exchange
rate, the variability of its rate of change, and the volatility of international reserves.
Bubula,  Otker-Robe and Anderson (BORA) utilize actual exchange rates supplemented by
information from IMF country reports and related sources (\press reports, news articles,
and other relevant papers").
These studies are widely cited, and the series on de facto exchange rate regimes they
provide have been widely used. It is unsettling, therefore, that they do not agree. Coun-
tries classied as maintaining a xed exchange rate by one set of investigators are some-
times classied as oating by another, and vice versa. This follows from the fact that
dierent authors use dierent variables in their algorithms for classifying countries, attach
dierent weights to dierent series, and employ dierent degrees of judgment. Since it is
not always clear why countries are classied as they are, it is not always clear why the
alternative series dier. These questions about the reliability of de facto exchange rate
classications in turn raise questions about the reliability of studies utilizing them. To
illustrate the point, we show in Appendix B that earlier studies of the impact of the ex-
change rate regimes on, inter alia, economic growth and nancial instability are sensitive
to the particular de facto exchange rate regime classication employed.
But while the existence of disagreements is well known, their extent and incidence are
not. Our goal in this paper is therefore to document and analyze the extent and nature of
disagreements among alternative de facto exchange rate regime classications. We con-
sider the Reinhart-Rogo, Levy-Yeyati-Sturzenegger and Bubula- Otker-Robe-Anderson
classications. We assemble two-way tables to study correspondences between the schemes.
We test whether classications are eectively independent using a Chi-square test and pro-
vide a statistical measure of the extent of agreement. We then use mixed-probit models
in which an unobservable propensity to disagree is related to a vector of economic and
nancial covariates to identify the sources of disagreements.
While the dierent classications are not independent according to our Chi-square
tests (de facto regime classications are not randomly assigned), the extent of agreement
2is fair to moderate, not substantial.4 In a non-negligible number of cases the discrepancy
is large: countries classied as operating a peg by one set of authors are described as
freely oating by another, and vice versa.
Importantly, discrepancies are not random. They are greater among middle-income
(emerging markets) and low-income (developing) countries than high-income (advanced)
countries. Some high-income countries like the United States have had oating exchange
rates for years and intervene sparingly in foreign exchange markets, while others have
operated well-specied pegs (European countries under the European Monetary System,
for example). Ample institutional detail results in a relatively high degree of agreement
across classications. The same is not always true of emerging markets and developing
countries. It is when analyzing these countries that users of de facto exchange rate regime
classications need to exercise particular caution.
We also nd that disagreements tend to be clustered in periods of currency volatility.
Periods of high volatility often coincide with crises and changes in exchange rate regime.
This suggests that investigators should exercise special caution when relating the de facto
exchange rate regime to nancial crises.5
We further nd that de jure classications are an important source of disagreement on
how to classify exchange rate regimes in emerging markets and developing countries. This
is true even when we control for other economic and nancial characteristics of countries.
Evidently, the fact that some investigators constructing de facto classications rely more
heavily than others on the IMF's de jure classication leads to disagreements.
Finally, we nd that the disagreement among alternative classications is greatest for
countries with relatively well developed nancial markets and low reserves. The openness
of the nancial account is also an important source of disagreements between some classi-
cations. This suggests caution when attempting to relate choice of exchange rate regime
to nancial development, openness of the nancial account, and reserve-management de-
cisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we study correspondences
among de facto classications and measure the extent of agreement using Kappa statistics
and Chi-square tests. Section 3 presents the mixed-probit model and results. In Section
4The language here is from Landis and Koch (1977).
5As not a few studies have attempted over the years.
34 we check the robustness of the ndings with respect to dierent dividing lines between
pegs, intermediate regimes and exible rates. Final remarks are in Section 5.
2 Data Analysis
Dierent studies distinguish dierent exchange rate regimes. A rst step in comparing
alternative schemes is thus to collapse the larger number of categories into a consistent set:
pegs, intermediate regimes, and oats, reecting the traditional tripartite categorization.
Previous studies provide a good deal of guidance about how to go about this, and there
is broad agreement about where to draw the lines.6 It could be, however, that collapsing
a larger number of categories spuriously introduces disagreements by placing the dividing
line between pegs, oats and intermediate regimes at incompatible points. It will be
important therefore to check that our ndings are robust to dierent dividing lines.7
Combining market exchange rates and other series with assessments of the nature
of the exchange rate regime drawn from consultations with member countries and IMF
country desk economists, Bubula,  Otker-Robe and Anderson distinguish thirteen exchange
rate arrangements. We collapse their thirteen categories into hard pegs, intermediate and
oating regimes following Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006). Our denition of hard
pegs includes regimes that use another currency as legal tender, currency union, currency
board, and economic union or monetary coordination agreement (see Table 1). Intermedi-
ate regimes include conventional xed pegs to a single currency, conventional xed pegs to
a basket, pegs within a horizontal band, forward-looking crawling pegs, forward-looking
crawling bands, backward-looking crawling pegs, backward-looking crawling bands, and
tightly managed oating. Floating regimes include other managed oats and indepen-
dently oats.8
When there are multiple exchange rates, Reinhart and Rogo (2004) use information
from informal (black or parallel) markets to identify exchange rate arrangements. They
argue that market-determined dual or parallel markets are important, if not better, in-
dicators of the underlying monetary policy. We map their fourteen categories into pegs,
6For discussion see Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006).
7In particular, we will want to consider dividing lines that maximize the concordance between dierent
series.
8This classication has been updated by IMF sta through 2008.
4intermediate regimes and oats as follows.9 Hard pegs comprise categories 1 through 3
in Reinhart and Rogo's (2004) classication: no separate legal tender, pre-announced
pegs or currency boards, and pre-announced horizontal bands narrower than, or equal to,
plus/minus 2%. Soft pegs consist of categories 4 through 11: de facto pegs, pre-announced
crawling pegs, pre-announced crawling bands narrower than, or equal, to +/-2%, de facto
crawling pegs, de facto crawling bands narrower than, or equal to, +/-2%, pre-announced
crawling bands wider than, or equal, to +/-2%, de facto crawling bands narrower than, or
equal to, +/-5%, and moving bands narrower than, or equal to, +/-2% (i.e., allowing for
both appreciation and depreciation over time). Floats include two categories: managed
oating and freely oating. The observations in Reinhart and Rogo's \freely falling"
category are reclassied using their detailed chronologies.10
Finally, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) assume that pegs are associated with
low volatility of exchange rates (in levels and changes) and high volatility of international
reserves, while oating regimes are characterized by volatile exchange rates (in levels and
changes) and stable international reserves. They use cluster analysis to distinguish ve
arrangements: 1) inconclusive; 2) oats; 3) dirty oats; 4) crawling pegs; and 5) pegs.11
We count categories 3, 4 and some of the regimes in category 5 as intermediate regimes
(see Table 1).
9See Table 1.
10A country's exchange rate regime is classied as \freely falling" when the 12-month ination rate
is equal to or exceeds 40% in one year, or the six months following an exchange rate crisis where the
crisis marked a movement from a peg or an intermediate regime to a oating regime (managed or freely
oating). For more details on this classication, see the Appendix in Reinhart and Rogo (2004).
11A country's ER arrangement is classied as \inconclusive" when the volatility of the ER and the
volatility of international reserves are low. In their latest update, less than 2% of regimes were classied
as \inconclusive." Since we could not re-classify these observations into pegs, intermediate or oating
regimes they are left out of the analysis.
5Table 1: Collapsing the Currency Spectrum into Hard Pegs, Intermediate and Floating Regimes
RRy BORAz LYSx
Hard Pegs No separate legal tender Another currency as legal tender Fix 1]
Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement Currency union
Pre announced horizontal band narrower than or equal to +/-2% Currency board
Economic union/Monetary coordination agreement
Intermediate De facto peg Conventional xed peg to a single currency Fix 2]
Pre announced crawling peg Conventional xed peg to a basket Dirty
Pre announced crawling band narrower than or equal to +/-2% Pegged within horizontal bands Crawling peg
De facto crawling peg Forward-looking crawling peg
De facto crawling band narrower than or equal to +/-2% Forward-looking crawling band
Pre announced crawling band wider than or equal to +/-2% Backward-looking crawling peg
De facto crawling band narrower than or equal to +/-5% Backward-looking crawling band
Moving band narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows Other tightly managed oating
for both appreciation and depreciation over time)
Floating Managed oating Managed oating with no predetermined Float
Freely oating path for the ER
Independently oating
Notes: y Reinhart and Rogo de Facto classication: 1980-2006. Freely Falling Reclassied following Chronologies.
z Bubula,  Otker-Robe and Anderson de Facto classication: 1980-2007
x Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger de Facto classication: 1980-2004. ] Fix 1 is xed ERR in LYS and an hard peg de jure classication (Gosh, Gulde and Wolf).
] Fix 2 is a xed ERR in LYS and a non-hard peg in a de jure classication (Gosh, Gulde and Wolf).
62.1 Contingency Tables
Reinhart and Rogo vs Bubula,  Otker-Robe and Anderson
Table 2 presents two-way tables for the three pairs of de facto classications. In panel A
we combine the data for advanced, emerging market and developing countries. Panel B
restricts the sample to emerging markets, panel C to advanced countries, and panel D to
developing countries.
Panel A shows that RR and BORA agree on 69% of observations.12 Floating regimes
display the highest discrepancy, followed by soft pegs and then hard pegs. While more
than half of oating rates in BORA are classied as intermediate regimes by RR, a bit less
than 50% oating rates in RR are classied as intermediate regimes by BORA. Roughly
a fourth of intermediate regimes in RR are classied as hard pegs or oating rates by
BORA, and about a third of soft pegs in BORA are classied as either hard pegs or
exible rates by RR. Highlighting the scope of potential disagreement is the fact that 21
hard pegs in RR are classied as oats by BORA.
These patterns dier across emerging markets, advanced and developing countries. For
example, hard pegs appear to be less dicult to identify in advanced countries than emerg-
ing markets and developing countries (rst matrix in Panels B, C and D). In emerging
markets, whereas half of all oating regimes in BORA (RR) are classied as intermediate
regimes by RR (BORA), 23% (20%) of intermediate regimes in BORA (RR) are classied
as oating by RR (BORA).
Both classications exhibit a higher degree of correspondence for advanced countries.
Approximately 16% (22%) of intermediate regimes in BORA (RR) are classied as oats
by RR (BORA). It would appear that hard pegs are especially dicult to identify in
developing countries: 26% of hard pegs in RR are classied as intermediate regimes or
oating by BORA.
Analyzing changes in the contingency tables over time, there is evidence of increasing
agreement about hard pegs and oats but declining agreement about intermediate regimes.
BORA identify fewer intermediate regimes in relatively recent years, while RR do not.13
The number of observations classied as intermediate by RR and oating by BORA has
12Out of 3857 regimes, RR and BORA agree in 837 hard pegs, 1392 intermediates and 421 oats.
13While more than 70% of the regimes classied in 1980 by BORA were soft pegs, in 2007 this proportion
reduced to 40%.
7risen rather than falling over time.14 Finally, the number of regimes classied as hard
pegs by RR and intermediate by BORA fell in the 1980s and remained roughly constant
thereafter.
Panel A in Figure 1 shows the proportion of observations for which the two classi-
cations agree. The concordance between these two schemes improved from 1980 to 1985
and has since then remained more or less constant at 70%.
Reinhart and Rogo vs Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
RR and LYS agree on 60% of regimes (second matrix in Panel A of Table 2), fewer than
RR and BORA. 41% of hard pegs in RR are classied as intermediate or oating regimes
by LYS. While 60% of RR's exible regimes are classied as soft pegs by LYS, 59% of
oats in LYS are classied as intermediate arrangements by RR. Evidently, intermediate
regimes are specially hard for these two sets of investigators to agree on. Of the 2073
intermediate arrangements in LYS, 538 (26%) are classied as hard pegs and 433 (21%)
as oats by RR, while of the 1560 soft pegs in RR 443 (28%) are grouped as oats by
LYS. RR thus classify many more observations as hard pegs and considerably fewer as
intermediate regimes.
Results are similar for emerging markets and developing countries (second matrix in
Panels B and D of Table 2). Quite a few cases classied as hard pegs by RR are classied
as intermediates by LYS. Similarly, not a few arrangements classied as intermediates
by one scheme are categorized as exible by the other. For advanced economies (second
matrix in Panel D), there is more agreement.
The main change over time is increased agreement about hard pegs. There is also
a declining number of cases in which RR=oating and LYS=intermediate regime. In
contrast, the number of observations classied as intermediate by RR and as oating by
LYS rises with time.
Panel B in Figure 1 shows changes over time in the fraction of arrangements on which
the two classications agree. Contrary to the lack of improvement in the extent of agree-
ment between RR and BORA, the concordance between RR and LYS rises with time:
whereas RR and LYS agreed on 55% of the observations in the 1980s, they agree on more
14The latter at the expense of the observations classied as oating by RR and as soft pegs by BORA.
8than two thirds of regimes in 2004.15
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger vs Bubula,  Otker-Robe and Anderson
LYS and BORA agree on 75% of regimes (third matrix in Panel A of Table 2), higher than
any other pair.16 Intermediate and oating regimes are again the most dicult on which
to agree. While more than 50% of regimes classied as exible by BORA are classied as
intermediates by LYS, 46% of oats in LYS are classied as intermediate arrangements
by BORA. Of 1914 intermediate arrangements in LYS, 112 (6%) are classied as hard
pegs and 386 (20%) as exible regimes by BORA, while of the 1741 soft pegs in BORA,
321 observations (18%) are classed as oats by LYS. BORA classify more regimes as both
hard pegs and oats than LYS.
For emerging markets and advanced countries, LYS and BORA agree on almost all
hard pegs. However, they show less agreement about intermediate regimes and oats
(third matrix in Panels B and C in Table 2). They have also diculty in agreeing on
regimes in developing countries more generally (Panel D in Table 2).
The two classications exhibit a higher degree of correspondence over time on hard
pegs and oating regimes but not on intermediate regimes.17 Overall, panel C in Figure
1 shows a decline in the degree of agreement between LYS and BORA from 1980 to 1994
followed by a rise back up to earlier levels around 2004.
Robustness Checks
We perform two robustness checks. First, to see whether the results are driven by dier-
ences in sample periods we assemble a three-way table limited to the period common to
all three schemes (1980-2004).18 We still nd large-o diagonal cells, which indicates that
disagreements are not driven by dierences in sample period.19
Second, we check whether disagreements are mainly due to discrepancies in timing.
15The reason is that both classications have agreed more in terms of hard pegs over time.
16667 arrangements were classied as hard pegs, 1416 as intermediates, and 369 as oating regimes by
both schemes.
17The number of observations classied as oats by BORA and as intermediate regimes by LYS has
increased over time. In particular, it appears that LYS classications has problems to identify regime in
periods of macroeconomic distress.
18Available from the authors upon request.
19By construction, the three-way table limits the analysis to those observations for which we have the
three classications.
9To do this we compute the proportion of the o-diagonal cells where one of the two regime
classications changed in year t, creating a disagreement that did not exist in year t   1,
and then the other classication changed in year t+1, making the disagreement go away.20
Only 2.9% of our recorded disagreements (o-diagonal cells) between RR and BORA are
due to this \one-year" discrepancy.21 Although higher ratios are observed for the other
two pairs, 7% for RR-LYS and 15% for BORA-LYS, here too it remains that our results
are not mainly driven by disagreements in the timing of exchange rate regime shifts.
2.2 Independence (Chi-Square) Tests












where Oij is the observed frequency for regime i in classication 1 and regime j in classi-
cation 2, and Eij is the expected frequency for the cell corresponding to the ith regime in
the rst classication and the jth arrangement in the second scheme.23 The null hypoth-
esis is rejected if this statistic exceeds the critical value obtained from the 2 distribution
with m degrees of freedom.24 In all cases the null of independence is rejected, supporting
the hypothesis that the three classications are related.
20For example, RR identify an intermediate regime for Sweden in 1992 while BORA identify a oat.
In this specic example, the disagreement between the two classications is due to a disagreement in the
timing of an exchange rate regime change: BORA identify a switch from a soft peg to a oating regime
in 1992 and RR in 1993.
21This ratio also includes cases in which BORA changed in year t, creating a disagreement that did
not exist in the previous year, and then in period t + 1 this changed is reversed.
22For example, for the pair RR-BORA under the null hypothesis Pr(RR=Hard PegjBORA=Hard
Peg)=Pr(RR=Hard PegjBORA=Intermediate)=Pr(RR=Hard PegjBORA=Floating)=Pr(RR=Hard
Peg).
23The 2 test is inappropriate if any expected frequency is below 1 or if the expected frequency is less
than 5 in more than 20% of the cells. Had this been the case, we would have to combine rows or columns.
24 The degrees of freedom are equal to (3-1)(3-1).
10Table 2: Two-Way Tables. Number of Countries with Hard Pegs, Intermediate and Floating Regimes.
Panel A: Advanced, Emerging Market and Developing Countries
BORA LYS LYS
HP Inter. Float Total HP Inter. Float Total HP Inter. Float Total
R
&
R HP 837 277 21 1135
R
&




A HP 667 112 3 782
Inter. 56 1392 466 1914 Inter. 15 1102 443 1560 Inter. 4 1416 321 1741
Float 2 385 421 808 Float 0 433 290 723 Float 0 386 369 755
Total 895 2054 908 3857 Total 780 2073 756 3609 Total 671 1914 693 3278
Panel B: Emerging Market Countries
BORA LYS LYS
HP Inter. Float Total HP Inter. Float Total HP Inter. Float Total
R
&
R HP 81 29 5 115
R
&




A HP 67 2 0 69
Inter. 1 388 101 490 Inter. 0 238 175 413 Inter. 0 270 164 434
Float 0 122 102 224 Float 0 114 101 215 Float 0 67 92 159
Total 82 539 208 829 Total 73 419 281 773 Total 67 339 256 662
Panel C: Advanced Countries
BORA LYS LYS
HP Inter. Float Total HP Inter. Float Total HP Inter. Float Total
R
&
R HP 106 3 1 110
R
&




A HP 63 19 0 82
Inter. 19 237 74 330 Inter. 0 273 89 362 Inter. 0 204 43 247
Float 0 45 147 192 Float 0 57 129 186 Float 0 49 124 173
Total 125 285 222 632 Total 76 355 220 651 Total 63 272 167 502
Panel D: Developing Countries
BORA LYS LYS
HP Inter. Float Total HP Inter. Float Total HP Inter. Float Total
R
&
R HP 650 245 15 910
R
&




A HP 537 91 3 631
Inter. 36 767 291 1094 Inter. 15 591 179 785 Inter. 4 942 114 1060
Float 2 218 172 392 Float 0 262 60 322 Float 0 270 153 423
Total 688 1230 478 2396 Total 631 1299 255 2185 Total 541 1303 270 2114
Notes: The rst matrix in each panel presents the two-way table associated with Reinhart and Rogo vs Bubula,  Otker-Robe
and Anderson classications. The second matrix compares Reinhart and Rogo with Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger scheme.
The last matrix in each panel presents the Bubula, Otker-Robe and Anderson vs Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger two-way table.
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Panel C: Agreement Between BORA and LYS
Note: The three graphs present the fraction of the observations in which a pair of classications
agree (hard-pegs-hard-pegs, intermediate-intermediate, oating-oating).
2.3 Analysis of the Correspondence using Kappa Statistics
The Kappa Statistic (Cohen, 1960) is scaled to be 0 when the extent of agreement is what
would be observed by chance and 1 when there is perfect agreement. For intermediate
cases, Landis and Koch (1977) suggest the interpretations in Table 4.
Let m be the number of \raters" and k the number of regimes. For two \raters," m = 2,
dene wij (i = 1;:::;k;j = 1;:::;k) as the weights for agreement and disagreement.
12Table 3: Nonparametric Test of Independence
2 df p-value
Reinhart and Rogo vs Bubula and  Otker-Robe
All Countries 2598 4 <0.0001
Emerging Market 603 4 <0.0001
Advanced 659 4 <0.0001
Developing 1404 4 <0.0001
Reinhart and Rogo vs Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
All Countries 1778 4 <0.0001
Emerging Market 373 4 <0.0001
Advanced 580 4 <0.0001
Developing 900 4 <0.0001
Bubula and  Otker-Robe vs Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
All Countries 2972 4 <0.0001
Emerging Market 662 4 <0.0001
Advanced 502 4 <0.0001
Developing 1860 4 <0.0001
Source: Author's estimates







0.81 1.00 Almost Perfect
Source: Landis and Koch (1977)








where pij is the fraction of regimes i by rst classication (rater) and j by the second.









j pij and pj =
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If RR and BORA had classied regimes randomly with probabilities equal to the
overall proportions, we would expect the two classications to agree on 38% of regimes.
In fact they agree on 69%, 49% of the way between random and perfect agreement. From
this we conclude that the strength of agreement is moderate (see Table 4) and reject the
null that RR and BORA are classifying regimes randomly. Advanced countries exhibit
the highest degree of correspondence (64% of the way between random agreement and
perfect agreement), followed by developing countries (46%) and emerging markets (42%).
The strength of agreement between RR and LYS is similarly moderate. These two
classications agree on 60% observations, 36% of the way between random and perfect
agreement. Advanced countries exhibit the highest degree of agreement (54%), followed
by developing countries (33%) and emerging countries (21%).
BORA and LYS agree on 75% observations, 58% of the way between random and
perfect agreement. Again this is a moderate level of agreement. However, advanced and
developing countries exhibit a substantial degree of agreement: 63% and 61%, respec-
tively.25
In Figure 2 we show the Kappa Statistic over time. RR and BORA exhibit rising
agreement over time. The same rising trend is evident for the RR-LYS pair but not for
LYS-BORA Again, we can observe that the two pairs including LYS classication show
a jump in the Kappa Statistic around 1994. For the pair BORA-LYS, for example, the
degree of agreement changes from moderate to fair from 1993 to 1994.
Predictably, agreement is lower still when we compute the combined Kappa Statistic
for the three classications (m = 3). Let ni be the number of ratings on observation nth
25Followed by a moderate degree of agreement in emerging countries (37%).





























1980 1985 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990
tiempo




























1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
tiempo




























1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
tiempo
Panel C: Kappa Statistic BORA and LYS










N and mn is the number of \raters" in observation nth.26 The combined
26For some observations we only have two classications so in that case mn = 2. For the observations
with three de facto classications mn = 3.
15Table 5: Kappa Statistics.
Agreement Expected Kappa Standard. Z Prob>Z
Agreement Statistic Error
Reinhart and Rogo vs. Bubula,  Otker-Robe and Anderson
All Countries 0.6871 0.3819 0.4937 0.0116 42.60 0
Emerging Markets 0.6888 0.4658 0.4174 0.0266 15.70 0
Advanced Countries 0.7753 0.3766 0.6396 0.0290 22.05 0
Developing 0.6632 0.3761 0.4602 0.0148 30.99 0
Reinhart and Rogo vs Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
All Countries 0.5977 0.3697 0.3617 0.0116 31.19 0
Emerging Markets 0.5330 0.4084 0.2106 0.0268 7.87 0
Advanced Countries 0.7343 0.4183 0.5432 0.0297 18.31 0
Developing 0.5799 0.3733 0.3296 0.0150 21.99 0
Bubula,  Otker-Robe and Anderson vs Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
All Countries 0.7480 0.4076 0.5746 0.0127 45.32 0
Emerging Markets 0.6480 0.4391 0.3725 0.0294 12.68 0
Advanced Countries 0.7789 0.4017 0.6304 0.0337 18.71 0
Developing 0.7720 0.4110 0.6129 0.0158 38.72 0
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The rst column of Table 6 presents the combined Kappa Statistic, while the next
three columns show the Kappa Statistic for each regime.27 Overall, agreement is moderate
(0.46). There is considerably more agreement about hard pegs than other regimes. The
27Since the number of raters is not constant for all the observations (i.e. 2 or 3) it is not possible to
calculate the approximate standard errors and the Z-statistic.
16combined Kappa Statistic indicates that the strength of agreement between the three
classications is only fair for emerging markets. Advanced countries again exhibit the
highest degree of agreement (0.61), followed by developing countries and then emerging
markets.
Table 6: Combined Kappa Statistics.
 b 
hard peg b 
intermediate b 
flexible
All Countries 0.4588 0.7372 0.3522 0.2887
Emerging Markets 0.3260 0.7672 0.2307 0.1899
Advanced Countries 0.6087 0.8597 0.5161 0.5249
Developing 0.4438 0.6949 0.3457 0.2074
3 Mixed Probit Models
In this section we estimate mixed-probit models to analyze how economic and institutional
factors aect the probability of agreement.
3.1 Denition of the Discrete Variables
Let RRit, BORAit and LY Sit be the exchange rate regime of country i in period t obtained
from Reinhart and Rogo; Bubula,  Otker-Robe and Anderson; and Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger classications, respectively. Formally,
Yit =
8
> > > <
> > > :
HP if ERR by Y is a hard peg
I if ERR by Y is an intermediate regime
F if ERR by Y is a oating regime
where Y = fRR;BORA;LY Sg.
For each pair of classications X and Z, for X = fRR;BORAg, Z = fBORA;LY Sg
and X 6= Z, we dene 3 dummy variables. The rst, DX>Z, captures whether macroeco-
nomic and institutional factors aect the probability of observing a more exible regime in
classication X relative to the regime in classication Z; X > Z (e.g. RR=Intermediate
and BORA= Hard Peg). DZ>X
it , the second binary variable, analyzes the opposite case;
17observations in which classication Z implies a more exible arrangement than classi-
cation X (Z > X). The third variable, D
X6=Z
it , is used to investigate what factors
systematically aect the probability of observing dierent regimes in X and Z de facto
classications (the o-diagonal elements of the two-way table). Formally, these three







1 if Xit > Zit
0 if Xit = Zit







1 if Xit < Zit
0 if Xit = Zit







1 if Xit 6= Zit
0 if Xit = Zit
This dummy variable is related to the o diagonal elements of the two-way tables.
For each of these three dummy variables we propose a discrete choice model in which






 + i + it (6)
where  = fX > Z;Z > X;X 6= Zg, D is an unobservable latent index describing
the likelihood of observing event , Xit is a vector of exogenous regressors,  is a vector
of parameters associated with Xit, i is a country-specic random eect aecting the
probability of event  (assumed to be i:i:d: normally distributed with mean zero and
variance 2
), and it is a random term representing all the factors aecting D not
included in X. We assume that the probability density function of it is the standard
normal distribution (it  N(0;1)). Although D cannot be observed, we observe the
three discrete variables dened above.28
28Initially we dened two extra dummy variables to deal with two of the o-diagonal elements of the
two-way tables with more disagreements, entries (2,3) and (3,2). For the sake of brevity we exclude
183.2 Explanatory Variables
We dene Flexible de Jure as a dummy variable equal to one if the IMF de jure classi-
cation signies a oat and Intermediate de Jure as a binary variable equal to one if the
IMF de jure classication denotes a soft peg.29
Other independent variables are ination, per capita income, M2/GDP as a proxy for
nancial development, reserves (normalized by M2), trade openness (
exports+imports
GDP ), size,
degree of democratization, nancial openness, and two binary variables denoting advanced
or emerging market countries. We also include the volatility of the nominal exchange rate
dened as the standard deviation of the monthly change of the (log) nominal exchange
rate over the preceding ve years. All explanatory variables, except for the dummies and
the democracy measure, are lagged one year.
3.3 Results
Table 7 uses data for advanced, emerging market and developing countries, Table 8 for
emerging markets only, and Table 9 for advanced countries only.30 The rst three columns
present the results for RR-BORA, columns (4)-(6) for RR-LYS, and columns (7)-(9) for
BORA-LYS.
The results suggest that ination, international reserves, nancial openness, nancial
development, per capita income, intermediate and exible de jure are signicant sources of
disagreement over how to classify exchange rate regimes. Ination signicantly increases
the likelihood of disagreements. The coecient on this variable is signicantly dierent
from zero at conventional condence levels in ve of the nine models estimated. The
results suggest that higher ination increases the likelihood of disagreements between RR
and BORA and between BORA and LYS but not between RR and LYS to the same
extent. Specically, ination increases the chances of observing a exible regime in RR
the results obtained with these two variables because they are similar to the ndings obtained with
models DX>Z
it and DZ>X
it . We do not dene dummy variables for the combinations of X=hard peg and
Y =exible (entry [3,1]), Z=exible and X= hard peg (entry [1,3]), and Z=hard peg and X=intermediate
(entry [2,1]) because there are not enough observations to identify the coecients.
29Since Hard peg de Jure+Intermediate de Jure+Flexible de Jure=1, then, in some models Flexible de
Jure or Intermediate de Jure is dropped o when one of these three binary variables is equal to zero for
all the observations included in that model (e.g. Intermediate de Jure+Flexible de Jure=1). In some
extreme cases both variables, Intermediate de Jure and Flexible de Jure, are dropped o because one of
those variables is equal to one for all the observations included in that model.
30A table presenting the results for developing countries is included in the Appendix (Table 14).
19relative to BORA and LYS (models 1 and 4) and in BORA relative to LYS (model 7).
This plausibly reects the fact that LYS's cluster analysis relies exclusively on reserves
and the nominal exchange rate to identify the regimes while the other two schemes use
additional information on, inter alia, prices.
The size and signicance of the coecients associated with ination also dier across
advanced, emerging and developing countries. Among emerging markets, the probability
of disagreement increases with ination in ve of the nine models; however, in only one
of them is statistically signicant (model 4 in Table 8). For advanced countries, ination
is positive and signicant in four of the nine models (Table 9). In high-income countries
ination becomes positive and signicant in models (2) and (5), implying that in advanced
countries with high ination, BORA and LYS are likely to classify an exchange rate regime
as more exible than RR. This is plausibly due to the fact RR use ination to classify
regimes whereas LYS does not.
Per capita income, which plausibly proxies for the strength of institutions, negatively
aects the probability of disagreement in six of the nine models. In three of these six
models the coecient is dierent from zero at conventional levels (models 1, 5 and 8 in
Table 7). Per capita income lowers the probability of identifying a more exible regime
in RR than BORA (model 1), the likelihood of observing a more exible regime in LYS
relative to RR (model 5), and the probability that exchange rate arrangement identied
by LYS is more exible than BORA (model 8). Other things equal, RR are more likely
classify a regime as more exible than LYS in higher per capita income countries (model
4). Similarly, per capita income raises the probability of identifying a more exible regime
in BORA than RR (model 2).31
There is also some evidence that disagreements are more prevalent in more nancially
developed economies, where nancial development is proxied by the M2/GDP ratio. But
this eect is limited to the RR-BORA and RR-LYS pairs. M2/GDP is positive and
signicant in three models (Table 7, models 2, 3 and 4), indicating that the cases in
which RR identify a more exible regime than LYS, and BORA a more exible than RR
are more prevalent in countries with relatively well developed nancial markets (models
2 and 4). In contrast, having a more developed nancial system reduces the probability
31Just a few of these results survive when we re-estimate the models using only emerging markets data.
On the contrary, the majority of these ndings hold when we use data from high-income countries.
20of identifying a more exible regime by RR relative to BORA (model 1).
Results here dier between emerging markets and advanced countries, however. In the
estimates for emerging markets, while two signicant coecients associated with M2/GDP
in Table 7 (models 2 and 4) are not longer signicant in Table 8, two of the insignicant
coecients in Table 7 become statistically dierent from zero at conventional levels in the
emerging market subsample (Table 8, models 5 and 6). An emerging market having a
more developed nancial sector increases the probability that LYS will classify a regime
as more exible than RR. In the advanced country subsample, M2/GDP is no longer
signicant in model (4), but it becomes signicant in models (5), and (6). The most
striking dierences are in the magnitude of the coecients associated with M2/GDP in
models (3), (6) and (9). These positive coecients again indicate that the development
of nancial markets increases the probability of a disagreement.
Similarly, disagreements are greater for countries with low international reserves, as
proxied by the reserves/M2 ratio. All the coecients associated with international re-
serves are negative. There is a negative correlation, for example, between international
reserves and the probability of identifying a more exible regime by RR relative to BORA
and LYS (models 1 and 4) and the likelihood that LYS will classify a regime as more ex-
ible than RR and BORA (models 5 and 8). This might seem counterintuitive given the
build-up of foreign exchange reserves in emerging markets and the fact that we still ob-
serve many o-diagonal entries dierent from zero in Panel B of Table 2. In Table 8 we
therefore re-estimate the models including only emerging markets. Although the coe-
cients on reserves mostly remain negative, only two of them are statistically signicant
at conventional signicance levels. We nd very dierent results for advanced countries
(Table 9). In high-income countries, in contrast, high international reserves consistently
raise the probability of disagreement.
There is evidence, in addition, that nancial openness is related to the probability of
disagreement. But this evidence is stronger for the RR-BORA and RR-LYS pairs than
for BORA-LYS. This may reect the fact that RR use data on black market rates for
nancially closed economies, whereas the other two do not. While model (3) in Table 7
suggests that for nancially-open economies the likelihood of a disagreement between RR
and BORA is high, model (6) indicates that nancial openness decreases the likelihood
21of disagreements between RR and LYS. These results are mainly driven by the fact that
nancial-openness raises the probability that BORA classify a regime as more exible than
RR (model 2) and decreases the likelihood of RR classifying a regime as more exible than
LYS (model 4). For the BORA-LYS pair, we nd that the probability of BORA classifying
a regime as more exible than LYS raises with the degree of nancial account openness
(model 7).32
Dierences in reliance on de jure classications also appear to be an important source
of disagreement. A de jure oating regime, for example, increases the likelihood that
BORA will classify a regime as more exible than RR (model 2) and LYS (model 7), the
probability of nding a more exible regime in LYS relative to RR (model 5), and the
likelihood of RR classifying a regime as more exible than LYS (model 4). Evidently,
some investigators (e.g. BORA) rely more on the IMF's de jure classication than others,
and this leads to a signicant number of disagreements. Most of these results hold when
the model is re-estimated using only data from advanced countries or emerging markets.
Similarly, the presence of a de jure intermediate regime raises the probability that RR
will identify the regime as a oat while BORA classify it as intermediate (model 1) and
likelihood that LYS classify a regime as more exible than RR (model 5). For BORA-LYS
pair, the three coecients in models (7)-(9) are positive and signicantly dierent from
zero at conventional levels suggesting that the presence of a de jure intermediate regime
increases the o-diagonal entries of the two-way table associated with this pair.33
The coecient associated with \democratic level" is signicant in seven of the nine
models. While RR and BORA and RR and LYS are less likely to disagree over more
democratic countries (models 3 and 6 in Table 7), BORA and LYS tend to disagree more
(model 9). In particular, democratic countries exhibit a lower probability of identifying
a more exible regime by RR relative to BORA and LYS (models 1 and 4), a lower
likelihood that BORA will classify a regime as more exible than RR (model 2), and
higher likelihood of observing a more exible regime in LYS than BORA (model 7).
Similar results are obtained for the emerging market subsample. In contrast, in advanced
countries with highly democratic political systems the three de facto classications are
32These results hold in the advanced and emerging market sub-samples.
33Some of these results survive in the emerging market and advance countries sub-samples, however,
in some cases there de jure intermediate regime was not linearly independent of de jure exible regime
so we drop it from the regression.
22Table 7: All Countries: Mixed-Probit Models.
RR (X) vs BORA (Z) RR (X) vs LY S (Z) BORA (X) vs LY S (Z)
X > Z Z > X X 6= Z X > Z Z > X X 6= Z X > Z Z > X X 6= Z
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ination 1.280 -.140 .858 1.541 -.343 .406 .888 .473 .601
(.451) (.465) (.294) (.392) (.349) (.272) (.363) (.412) (.286)
Per Capita Income -1.878 .560 -.133 .780 -.468 -.196 .309 -1.192 -.331
(.591) (.268) (.203) (.349) (.200) (.174) (.267) (.392) (.218)
M2/GDP -1.662 1.033 .714 .883 .098 .285 -.006 -.404 .112
(.655) (.364) (.298) (.480) (.288) (.255) (.404) (.467) (.310)
Reserves/M2 -.952 -.194 -.153 -.654 -.306 -.321 -.222 -.575 -.269
(.450) (.225) (.194) (.341) (.166) (.152) (.229) (.270) (.173)
Financial Openness -.149 .181 .092 -.293 -.039 -.095 .117 -.089 .002
(.087) (.046) (.039) (.065) (.039) (.035) (.050) (.058) (.038)
Flexible De Jure 1.013 .802 .602 .343 1.521 1.726 2.184 .360 1.535
(.556) (.146) (.132) (.145) (.242) (.227) (.351) (.300) (.221)
Intermediate De Jure 2.087 .177 .423 1.642 1.714 .913 .964 1.003
(.540) (.141) (.126) (.229) (.218) (.344) (.272) (.211)
ER Volatility .131 .481 .269 -.094 -.193 -.124 .150 .509 .322
(.338) (.931) (.281) (.175) (.357) (.167) (.437) (.272) (.246)
Trade Openness -1.115 .005 -.036 -.699 .025 -.153 -.099 -.590 -.263
(.513) (.227) (.202) (.333) (.172) (.156) (.225) (.276) (.175)
Size .016 -.078 -.033 -.047 .002 -.008 -.047 .008 -.025
(.043) (.042) (.023) (.034) (.010) (.009) (.029) (.020) (.016)
Democratic Level -.062 -.021 -.040 -.029 -.005 -.013 .007 .036 .021
(.017) (.011) (.009) (.012) (.009) (.007) (.011) (.012) (.008)
Emerging Market .815 -.365 -.018 .096 .048 .067 -.318 .615 .197
(.715) (.394) (.343) (.418) (.228) (.205) (.275) (.344) (.230)
Advanced Country 3.363 -2.116 -.240 -1.007 -.148 -.283 -1.306 .846 -.141
(1.315) (.741) (.570) (.776) (.414) (.369) (.587) (.703) (.449)
Constant -2.792 -1.767 -1.297 -2.139 -1.832 -1.721 -2.520 -1.514 -1.491
(.842) (.321) (.280) (.416) (.267) (.251) (.388) (.373) (.261)
Observations 2183 2434 2702 1820 2146 2428 2014 2050 2363
Notes: All the models are estimated using random eects. Standard Errors in parenthesis.
In model (4) Intermediate De Jure is not linearly independent of Flexible De Jure and Hard Peg De Jure.
less likely to disagree (Table 9).
Exchange rate volatility is also associated with discrepancies among BORA and LYS
classications. This variable enters as signicantly dierent from zero in column 8 of
Table 7. While all three sets of authors use this variable in constructing their classi-
cations, periods of volatility are also periods when regimes change, making classication
particularly dicult. Finally, while economic size does not aect the probability of a
disagreement when we estimate these equations on the full sample (Table 7), it does help
to explain discrepancies for emerging markets. Specically, disagreements among de facto
classications are less likely in the cases of larger emerging markets.
23Table 8: Emerging Markets: Mixed-Probit Models.
RR (X) vs BORA (Z) RR (X) vs LY S (Z) BORA (X) vs LY S (Z)
X > Z Z > X X 6= Z X > Z Z > X X 6= Z X > Z Z > X X 6= Z
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ination -.784 -.248 .436 .998 -.209 .319 .425 .624 -.005
(.952) (.815) (.451) (.540) (.508) (.375) (.530) (.567) (.403)
Per Capita Income -3.792 .636 .799 1.371 .381 .471 .485 -.276 .372
(3.091) (.473) (.450) (.668) (.378) (.288) (.408) (.538) (.288)
M2/GDP -7.837 -.010 -.957 .480 .988 .901 .694 -.331 .331
(2.114) (.646) (.565) (.835) (.519) (.417) (.627) (.681) (.456)
Reserves/M2 -4.974 -.439 -1.255 -.805 .003 -.161 .358 -.305 .031
(1.735) (.743) (.566) (.671) (.543) (.426) (.748) (.598) (.467)
Financial Openness -.065 .236 .174 -.375 -.044 -.157 .121 -.072 -.099
(.139) (.084) (.069) (.113) (.068) (.056) (.091) (.088) (.063)
Flexible De Jure 1.432 1.294 .876 .668 1.005 1.231 1.816 -.381 .565
(1.368) (.300) (.252) (.218) (.398) (.345) (.623) (.445) (.331)
Intermediate De Jure 1.903 -.038 .197 1.280 1.159 .833 .639 .634
(1.377) (.267) (.236) (.377) (.327) (.604) (.403) (.318)
ER Volatility -.105 -3.124 .306 -.151 -.319 -.112 .116 .589 .292
(.406) (2.270) (.325) (.188) (.658) (.174) (.466) (.293) (.261)
Trade Openness 1.872 .609 .702 -.122 -.487 -.514 -.418 -1.148 -.857
(1.284) (.396) (.359) (.551) (.322) (.253) (.380) (.458) (.296)
Size .292 -.110 -.050 .190 -.205 -.062 .122 -.327 -.100
(.233) (.097) (.079) (.106) (.084) (.053) (.068) (.106) (.055)
Democratic Level -.083 -.038 -.058 -.030 -.008 -.012 .027 .036 .035
(.036) (.020) (.017) (.020) (.015) (.012) (.022) (.017) (.013)
Constant -.052 -1.740 -.858 -2.786 -1.464 -1.344 -3.201 .107 -.634
(1.586) (.566) (.498) (.638) (.475) (.389) (.713) (.582) (.389)
Observations 579 596 696 460 563 662 448 530 594
Notes: All the models are estimated using random eects. Standard Errors in parenthesis.
In model (4) Intermediate De Jure is not linearly independent of Flexible De Jure and Hard Peg De Jure.
4 Alternative Congurations
We now check the robustness of our ndings with respect to dierent dividing lines be-
tween pegs, intermediate regimes and exible rates. Specically, we consider what dividing
lines maximize the concordance between the three schemes by maximizing the combined
Kappa Statistic. This requires analyzing 10,710 dierent ways of collapsing the 13 cate-
gories in Reinhart and Rogo, the 14 regimes in Bubula,  Otker-Robe and Anderson, and
the 5 categories in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger into pegged, intermediate and oating
arrangements.34
34Considering all potential ways of collapsing the three de facto classications would infeasible (i.e.
too many combinations and high computational cost) and some combinations in any case would not
make sense. For that reason we only consider 7, 34 and 45 dierent ways of collapsing the 5 regimes in
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, the 13 categories in Reinhart and Rogo, and the 14 regimes in Bubula,
 Otker-Robe and Anderson into pegs, intermediate and oats, respectively (10,710=7*34*45). Let Yl be
the category l in classication Y (= fRR;BORA;LY Sg) with l = 13 for Reinhart and Rogo, l = 14
for Bubula, Otker-Robe and Abderson and l = 5 for Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger. The most important
constraint we impose to make our analysis feasible and consistent is the following: if category Ym implies
a lower degree of exibility than Yn (e.g BORAm=currency board and Yn=pegged within horizontal
bands) then Ym cannot be assigned into a more exible regime (e.g. oat) than Yn (e.g. intermediate).
24Table 9: Advanced Countries: Mixed-Probit Models.
RR (X) vs BORA (Z) RR (X) vs LY S (Z) BORA (X) vs LY S (Z)
X > Z Z > X X 6= Z X > Z Z > X X 6= Z X > Z Z > X X 6= Z
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ination 15.774 24.731 11.575 -11.339 6.198 2.654 -8.614 6.600 4.364
(9.162) (10.486) (3.887) (5.923) (2.823) (2.539) (6.565) (4.030) (2.783)
Per Capita Income -2.844 1.586 -1.655 -2.429 -1.265 -2.160 .792 -1.692 -.764
(1.810) (.906) (.630) (1.173) (.481) (.579) (.628) (.972) (.540)
M2/GDP 11.680 12.323 9.664 -.927 1.466 2.510 .122 .299 1.462
(2.746) (2.876) (1.794) (1.949) (.686) (.760) (.978) (1.757) (.747)
Reserves/M2 19.350 7.402 8.184 1.849 .463 2.383 .091 .523 .0009
(7.611) (5.092) (3.067) (5.039) (1.909) (1.844) (3.519) (3.318) (2.134)
Financial Openness -1.844 .757 .299 -1.704 -.060 -.073 .523 -.015 .072
(.766) (.413) (.239) (.897) (.153) (.149) (.255) (.241) (.157)
Flexible De Jure -2.257 2.587 2.409 7.471 1.363 1.691 -1.046 1.278
(1.434) (.707) (.565) (2.954) (.353) (.357) (.594) (.322)
Intermediate De Jure .328 .911
(.691) (.547)
ER Volatility 43.612 -23.941 -6.465 -36.452 -33.042 -28.798 13.976 55.736 21.207
(62.708) (37.479) (24.880) (32.673) (19.277) (16.801) (27.183) (29.139) (17.910)
Trade Openness -13.292 .076 3.318 9.852 .718 1.963 -5.692 -2.724 -2.035
(4.741) (2.079) (1.677) (4.223) (1.062) (1.294) (2.068) (2.379) (1.467)
Size .009 -.424 -.058 -.013 -.001 .0009 -.140 .026 -.045
(.071) (.121) (.055) (.063) (.014) (.023) (.061) (.033) (.033)
Democratic Level -2.132 -.922 -1.131 -1.453 -.716 -.986 7.918 -.548 -.757
(1.108) (.698) (.429) (1.593) (.275) (.299) (637.807) (.351) (.336)
Constant 13.788 -7.913 -.056 7.581 6.198 8.993 -79.430 5.198 6.775
(11.340) (8.257) (4.695) (15.257) (2.674) (2.997) (6378.067) (3.781) (3.462)
Observations 483 507 552 435 467 516 417 415 459
Notes: All the models are estimated using random eects. Standard Errors in parenthesis.
In models (1), (4)-(9) Intermediate De Jure is not linearly independent of Flexible De Jure and Hard Peg De Jure.
The conguration maximizing the combined Kappa Statistic is shown in Table 10. The
only dierences from the conguration used above are that: 1) Pre announced horizontal
bands narrower than or equal to +/-2% in Reinhart and Rogo are now counted as
intermediate regimes rather than hard pegs; 2) Managed oating in Reinhart and Rogo
is now categorized as an intermediate regime rather than oating; and 3) Managed oating
with no predetermined path for the exchange rate in Bubula,  Otker-Robe and Anderson
is counted as an intermediate regime rather than oating.
The combined Kappa-statistic, in Table 11, rises by 7%, from 0.4588 to 0.4905. Rela-
tive to the two-way statistics shown in Table 5, the degree of agreement for all countries
increases for the three pairs (Table 12). But while the concordance between RR and
BORA increases for emerging markets and developing countries, it falls for advanced
countries. Agreement between RR and LYS rises for high-income (advanced) and low-
income (developing) countries and keeps constant for emerging markets. The strength of
agreement between BORA and LYS falls for advanced countries and emerging markets
but increases for developing economies.
25Comparing the two-way tables in Tables 2 and 13, we see that the now higher de-
gree of agreement across classications is reected mainly in greater agreement about
intermediate regimes. 35
We also nd more agreement about oats. Arithmetically, the decline in the proportion
of exible arrangements in RR (-13%) and BORA (-11%) is greater than the decline in the
proportion of observations on which both classications identify a oating regime (-7%).36
Panel A of Table 13 also shows that agreement is more extensive with this new con-
guration because of fewer observations in the larger o-diagonal cells (cells [2,3] and
[3,2] of the two-way tables). The number of observations in cell (3,2) of the two-way
table associated with RR and BORA, RR=exible and BORA=intermediate falls from
385 to 182. Similarly, the number of observations in cell (2,3), RR=intermediate and
BORA=exible, falls from 466 to 322. While the entry (3,2) in the two-way table of RR
and LYS falls from 433 to 111, the cell (2,3), RR=intermediate and LYS=exible, rises
only from 443 to 584. Thus, the rise in (2,3) is more than oset by the decline in (3,2),
implying a higher degree of agreement between RR and LYS. The strength of agreement
between BORA and LYS rises due to the fact that the decrease in entry (3,2) more than
osets the increase in cell (2,3).
While agreement between RR and BORA is higher with this new conguration for
emerging markets and developing countries, it is lower for advanced countries. The im-
provement in the concordance between RR and BORA for emerging markets and develop-
ing countries is caused by an increase in agreement about intermediate regimes and a fall
in the number of observations classied as intermediate by one scheme and exible by the
other (cells [2,3] and [3,2]). The lower agreement between RR and BORA for advanced
35This change is driven by an increase in the number of intermediate regimes in both RR and BORA
and by the fact that agreement about intermediate regimes increases more, as a percentage of the total
number of regimes, than the fraction of intermediate arrangements in RR and BORA.For example,
agreement about intermediate regimes in RR and BORA increases to 2018 or 52% of the all the regimes
in this new conguration of exchange rate arrangements (Panel A Table 13) from 1392 or 36% of all the
arrangements (Panel A Table 2). This increase of 16 percentage points is greater than the increase in
the number of arrangements identied as intermediate regimes in RR (13%) or BORA (11%). With the
new dividing lines there are 434 (11%) more intermediate regimes in BORA, relative to the conguration
presented in Table 1 and 483 (13%) more soft pegs in RR. The number of hard pegs, intermediate and
oating regimes does not change in LYS because the diving lines between categories is the same in Tables
2 and 13.
36We obtain these numbers from Tables 2 and 13. The proportion of oating regimes decreases from
21% to 8% in RR and from 23% to 12% in BORA. While in Table 2 RR and BORA agree on 421 oating
regimes, the two schemes agree on 144 with the new conguration (Table 13).
26countries is due to the increase in cell (2,3).
With the new conguration, the Kappa statistic associated with RR-LYS classi-
cations remains constant for emerging markets while rising for advanced and develop-
ing countries. Greater agreement about soft pegs and fewer observations in cell (3,2),
RR=Flexible and LYS=Intermediate, drive the rise in agreement between RR and LYS
classications for high- and low-income economies.37 In contrast, the concordance between
BORA and LYS rises only for developing countries.
In sum, even when the correspondence across the three classications is maximized
we still observe many disagreements, and the overall patterns described above continue
to obtain.
5 Final Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed disagreements between de facto exchange-rate-regime
classications using data on three popular classication schemes. While there exists a
reasonable degree of concurrence across classications, disagreements are not uncommon,
and they are not random. Disagreements are most prevalent in middle-income countries
(emerging markets) and low-income (developing) countries. Some are centered in periods
of currency volatility when the exchange-rate regime is prone to change. De jure classi-
cations are also a source of disagreement on how to classify exchange rate practice in
emerging markets and developing countries, suggesting that dierent investigators rely on
them to diering extents. Disagreements are relatively prevalent for countries with well-
developed nancial markets and low reserves. Financial openness is also an important
source of disagreements between some de facto classications.
The existence of disagreements among the popular de facto exchange-rate-regime clas-
sications suggests caution when using them in empirical work. The incidence and cor-
relates of those disagreements suggest particular caution when using them to analyze
exchange-rate regimes in emerging markets and developing countries. It suggests special
caution when attempting to relate the de facto exchange rate regime to nancial stabil-
ity, nancial development, the openness of the nancial account, and reserve management
37For these type of countries the decrease in cell (3,2) is higher than the increase in the number of
regimes in cell (2,3). Therefore, the total number of observations in the o-diagonal cells decreases.
27and accumulation decisions.
On a more positive note, these ndings also point to the countries and country char-
acteristics on which investigators should focus when rening existing de facto regime
classications and constructing new ones.
28Table 10: Alternative Collapsing of the Currency Spectrum into Hard Pegs, Intermediate and Floating Regimes
RRy BORAz LYSx
Pegs No separate legal tender Another currency as legal tender Fix 1]
Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement Currency union
Currency board
Economic union/Monetary coordination agreement
Intermediate Pre announced horizontal band narrower than or equal to +/-2% Conventional xed peg to a single currency Fix 2]
De facto peg Conventional xed peg to a basket Dirty
Pre announced crawling peg Pegged within horizontal bands Crawling peg
Pre announced crawling band narrower than or equal to +/-2% Forward-looking crawling peg
De facto crawling peg Forward-looking crawling band
De facto crawling band narrower than or equal to +/-2% Backward-looking crawling peg
Pre announced crawling band wider than or equal to +/-2% Backward-looking crawling band
De facto crawling band narrower than or equal to +/-5% Other tightly managed oating
Moving band narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows Managed oating with no predetermined
for both appreciation and depreciation over time) path for the ER
Managed oating
Floating Freely oating Independently oating Float
Notes: y Reinhart and Rogo De Facto classication. Freely Falling Reclassied following Chronologies.
z Bubula,  Otker-Robe and Anderson De Facto classication.
x Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger De Facto classication. ] Fix 1 is xed ERR in LYS and an hard peg de jure classication (Gosh, Gulde and Wolf).
] Fix 2 is a xed ERR in LYS and a non-hard peg in a de jure classication (Gosh, Gulde and Wolf).
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9Table 11: Combined Kappa Statistic: New Conguration
 b 
hard peg b 
intermediate b 
flexible
All Countries 0.4905 0.7381 0.4295 0.1719
Table 12: Kappa Statistic: New Conguration
Agreement Expected Kappa Standard. Z Prob>Z
Agreement Statistic Error
Reinhart and Rogo vs. Bubula,  Otker-Robe and Anderson
All Countries 0.7775 0.4795 0.5726 0.0125 45.77 0
Emerging Markets 0.8094 0.6276 0.4883 0.0258 18.91 0
Advanced Countries 0.7484 0.4239 0.5633 0.0278 20.25 0
Developing 0.7742 0.4653 0.5778 0.0167 34.58 0
Reinhart and Rogo vs Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
All Countries 0.6487 0.4166 0.3978 0.0119 33.43 0
Emerging Markets 0.5317 0.4456 0.1553 0.0216 7.18 0
Advanced Countries 0.7773 0.4470 0.5972 0.0275 21.75 0
Developing 0.6517 0.4202 0.3993 0.0164 24.30 0
Bubula,  Otker-Robe and Anderson vs Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
All Countries 0.7590 0.4485 0.5630 0.0127 44.26 0
Emerging Markets 0.6329 0.4551 0.3264 0.0246 13.25 0
Advanced Countries 0.7390 0.4134 0.5551 0.0336 16.51 0
Developing 0.8032 0.4683 0.6299 0.0170 37.12 0
30Table 13: Two-Way Tables. Number of Countries with Pegs, Intermediate and Floating Regimes. New Conguration
Panel A: Advanced, Emerging Market and Developing Countries
BORA LYS LYS
HP Inter. Float Total HP Inter. Float Total HP Inter. Float Total
R
&
R HP 837 288 8 1133
R
&




A HP 667 112 3 782
Inter. 57 2018 322 2397 Inter. 15 1425 584 2024 Inter. 4 1614 483 2101
Float 1 182 144 327 Float 0 111 151 262 Float 0 188 207 395
Total 895 2488 474 3857 Total 780 2073 756 3609 Total 671 1914 693 3278
Panel B: Emerging Market Countries
BORA LYS LYS
HP Inter. Float Total HP Inter. Float Total HP Inter. Float Total
R
&
R HP 81 31 3 115
R
&




A HP 67 2 0 69
Inter. 1 567 88 656 Inter. 0 318 256 574 Inter. 0 307 211 518
Float 0 35 23 58 Float 0 34 20 54 Float 0 30 45 75
Total 82 633 114 829 Total 73 419 281 773 Total 67 339 256 662
Panel C: Advanced Countries
BORA LYS LYS
HP Inter. Float Total HP Inter. Float Total HP Inter. Float Total
R
&
R HP 106 2 0 108
R
&




A HP 63 19 0 82
Inter. 19 295 111 425 Inter. 0 330 120 450 Inter. 0 208 67 275
Float 0 27 72 99 Float 0 0 100 100 Float 0 45 100 145
Total 125 324 183 632 Total 76 355 220 651 Total 63 272 167 502
Panel D: Developing Countries
BORA LYS LYS
HP Inter. Float Total HP Inter. Float Total HP Inter. Float Total
R
&
R HP 650 255 5 910
R
&




A HP 537 91 3 631
Inter. 37 1156 123 1316 Inter. 15 777 208 1000 Inter. 4 1099 205 1308
Float 1 120 49 170 Float 0 77 31 108 Float 0 113 62 175
Total 688 1531 177 2396 Total 631 1299 255 2185 Total 541 1303 270 2114
Notes: The rst matrix in each panel presents the two-way table associated with Reinhart and Rogo vs Bubula,  Otker-Robe
and Anderson classications. The second matrix compares Reinhart and Rogo with Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger scheme.
The last matrix in each panel presents the Bubula, Otker-Robe and Anderson vs Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger two-way table.
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33A Mixed Probit Models: Developing Countries
Table 14: Developing Countries: Mixed-Probit Models.
RR (X) vs BORA (Z) RR (X) vs LY S (Z) BORA (X) vs LY S (Z)
X > Z Z > X X 6= Z X > Z Z > X X 6= Z X > Z Z > X X 6= Z
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ination 2.215 .306 1.261 1.841 -.731 .302 1.301 .020 .732
(.713) (.606) (.465) (.684) (.558) (.447) (.556) (.674) (.456)
Per Capita Income -1.661 .733 .421 -.671 .518 .219 -1.287 .128 -.777
(1.352) (.590) (.522) (1.186) (.445) (.402) (.758) (.784) (.554)
M2/GDP .172 -.389 -.030 -1.362 -2.078 -1.917 -.032 -.533 .087
(1.073) (.613) (.526) (1.040) (.565) (.503) (.784) (.855) (.592)
Reserves/M2 -.323 -.280 -.129 -.735 -.491 -.485 -.290 -.727 -.354
(.459) (.248) (.213) (.464) (.195) (.181) (.258) (.325) (.200)
Financial Openness -.167 .215 .132 -.317 .012 -.048 .112 -.120 .024
(.134) (.063) (.055) (.106) (.057) (.051) (.063) (.087) (.053)
Flexible De Jure -.343 .330 .191 -.678 1.893 1.862 2.219 .998 1.776
(.644) (.195) (.183) (.254) (.365) (.338) (.506) (.480) (.342)
Intermediate De Jure 1.663 .210 .457 2.182 2.299 1.236 .990 1.067
(.606) (.191) (.176) (.346) (.325) (.501) (.445) (.328)
ER Volatility -.045 .931 -.208 -.216 1.055 .487 -.183 .739 .110
(1.418) (1.080) (.850) (1.113) (.955) (.778) (1.087) (1.284) (.893)
Trade Openness -1.154 -.386 -.514 -.911 -.117 -.262 .408 -.491 .104
(.592) (.339) (.294) (.479) (.261) (.236) (.305) (.361) (.226)
Size 1.231 -1.267 -.294 1.340 -1.442 -.506 -.372 -1.447 -.878
(1.075) (1.050) (.704) (.819) (.777) (.478) (.789) (1.271) (.722)
Democratic Level -.046 -.001 -.025 -.005 .003 -.003 -.001 .029 .010
(.020) (.015) (.012) (.017) (.012) (.010) (.013) (.017) (.011)
Constant -2.998 -.868 -.737 -1.175 -1.443 -1.315 -2.791 -1.696 -1.656
(.867) (.435) (.384) (.578) (.384) (.357) (.566) (.529) (.370)
Observations 1121 1331 1454 925 1116 1250 1149 1105 1310
Notes: All the models are estimated using random eects. Standard Errors in parenthesis.
B Macroeconomic Performance, Banking Crises and
Exchange Rate Regime
In this section we estimate regressions that relate economic growth and the likelihood of
banking crises to the exchange rate regime. These illustrate and underscore our point
about the critical importance of dierences across de facto exchange rate regime clas-
sications for the conclusions drawn by researchers for a range of important empirical
questions.
B.1 Economic Growth
Following Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2003) we study the relationship between per capita
real GDP growth and the exchange rate regime controlling for variables that capture
factor accumulation (investment/GDP and the average number of years of schooling of
34the population) and catch-up eects (log of the ratio of the country's per capita GDP to
that of the United States). Following their specication, trade openness, taxes as a share
of GDP, terms of trade growth (to control for terms of trade shocks), population growth
and population size are added to the regression:
y
pc =0 + 1 Investment=GDP + 2 Trade Openness + 3 TOT + 4 Schooling+
5 Tax ratio + 6 log(Initial Income=U:S: Income) + 7 Population Growth+
8 log(Population) + 9 Pegged Regimes + 10 Intermediate Regimes +  (7)
where ypc is the per capital real GDP growth, TOT denotes terms of trade growth
and Schooling the average years of schooling.
Table 15 presents the results. The rst three columns show the estimated coecients
for the benchmark model (equation 7) using the three de facto exchange rate regime
classications. The next three columns add xed eects to the benchmark model. Table
16 uses observations for emerging markets only, and Table 17 for advanced countries only.
With the exception of the tax ratio and the RR and BORA pegged regime dummies,
the other right-hand-side variables display the expected signs and are statistically sig-
nicant at conventional levels of signicance in the benchmark models. The key result
for present purposes is that the coecients associated with the regime dummies exhibit
dierent signs across exchange rate regime classications. While pegged and intermediate
regimes appear to spur economic growth when the LYS classication is used, the opposite
result is found when RR or BORA is utilized. Also, while the pegged and intermediate
regime dummies are both statistically signicant when the LYS classication is used, only
the intermediate regime dummy is signicant when RR or BORA are utilized. Similar
results are obtain when xed eects are added.
In summary, results look dierent when one uses dierent de facto classications.
B.2 Banking Crises
In this section we examine how the choice of exchange rate regime aects the probability
of a banking crisis.38 A probit model is proposed to estimate the eect of the exchange
38Banking crises are identied as in Laeven and Valencia (2008). They dene a systemic banking crisis
when the corporate and nancial sectors of a country experience a large number of defaults and nancial
institutions and corporations face great diculties repaying contracts on time.
35rate regime on that probability.
In this exercise we follow the empirical model proposed by Domac and Martinez Peria
(2003). The exchange rate regime and a vector of macroeconomic and nancial variables
(the ination rate, the level and growth of real GDP per capita, the change in the terms
of trade, the ratio of net capital ows to GDP, the ratio of domestic credit to GDP, the
growth of domestic credit, and the ratios of M2 to reserves and foreign liabilities to foreign
assets) are included as explanatory variables. Two binary variables, pegged regimes and
intermediate regimes, are then added to investigate the link between the exchange rate
regime and the probability of a banking crisis. The three de facto exchange rate regime
classication are again used to check the robustness of the results.
Table 18 reports the results. The rst three columns use the three de facto classi-
cations and data from advanced, developing and emerging market countries. Columns
(4)-(6) use data for emerging markets only, and columns (7)-(9) for advanced countries
only. The estimated coecients associated with pegged and intermediate regimes are
strikingly dierent across de facto exchange rate regime classications, again underscor-
ing our point.
36Table 15: Per capita Real GDP growth regressions: Advanced, Developing and Emerging Market Countries
Benchmark Model Fixed Eects Model
LYS RR BORA LYS RR BORA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment/GDP .001 .001 .001 .002 .002 .002
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Trade Openness .009 .008 .008 .022 .024 .024
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Terms of Trade Growth .021 .022 .021 .016 .017 .016
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009)
Average years of Schooling .003 .003 .003 .002 .002 .002
(.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Tax ratio .005 -.002 .003 .034 .026 .033
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.019) (.019) (.019)
Initial Income/U.S. Income -.011 -.010 -.011
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Population Growth -.595 -.543 -.568 -.449 -.476 -.450
(.101) (.101) (.102) (.230) (.228) (.230)
Population Size .001 .001 .001 .014 .012 .018
(.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.011) (.011) (.011)
Pegged regimes (LYS) -.008 -.005
(.003) (.005)
Intermediate regimes (LYS) -.005 -.007
(.002) (.003)
Pegged regimes (RR) .005 .010
(.004) (.006)
Intermediate regimes (RR) .013 .014
(.003) (.005)
Pegged regimes (BORA) .0001 .013
(.003) (.006)
Intermediate regimes (BORA) .005 .010
(.003) (.004)
Fixed Eects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1949 1949 1949 1949 1949 1949
R2 .146 .154 .146 .072 .074 .074
F-statistic 33.259 35.326 33.252 15.853 16.189 16.205
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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7Table 16: Per capita Real GDP growth regressions: Emerging Markets
Benchmark Model Fixed Eects Model
LYS RR BORA LYS RR BORA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment/GDP .003 .002 .002 .003 .003 .003
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
Trade Openness -.005 -.001 -.003 -.008 -.003 -.003
(.005) (.004) (.005) (.012) (.012) (.012)
Terms of Trade Growth .020 .016 .018 .022 .021 .022
(.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019)
Average years of Schooling .002 .001 .003 .004 .002 .009
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Tax ratio .047 .022 .045 .040 .029 .049
(.019) (.020) (.019) (.034) (.034) (.033)
Initial Income=U.S. Income -.011 -.007 -.011
(.003) (.003) (.003)
Population Growth -.463 -.638 -.418 -.675 -.690 -.674
(.257) (.253) (.259) (.547) (.556) (.545)
Population Size .004 .004 .006 -.017 -.007 -.030
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.029) (.030) (.029)
Pegged regimes (LYS) .020 .036
(.007) (.012)
Intermediate regimes (LYS) -.010 -.005
(.004) (.004)
Pegged regimes (RR) .041 .042
(.009) (.011)
Intermediate regimes (RR) .034 .042
(.008) (.010)
Pegged regimes (BORA) .035 .046
(.008) (.013)
Intermediate regimes (BORA) .015 .016
(.006) (.007)
Fixed Eects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 528 528 528 528 528 528
R2 .264 .263 .26 .135 .145 .138
F-statistic 18.5 18.442 18.144 8.491 9.221 8.732
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
3
8Table 17: Per capita Real GDP growth regressions: Advanced Countries
Benchmark Model Fixed Eects Model
LYS RR BORA LYS RR BORA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment/GDP .001 .001 .001 .003 .003 .003
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
Trade Openness .019 .019 .020 .062 .064 .051
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.010) (.010) (.009)
Terms of Trade Growth .050 .044 .044 .049 .049 .049
(.025) (.025) (.025) (.024) (.023) (.024)
Average years of Schooling .003 .003 .003 .004 .004 .003
(.0006) (.0007) (.0007) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Tax ratio .017 .013 .010 .058 .059 .054
(.014) (.014) (.014) (.027) (.026) (.027)
Initial Income/U.S. Income -.020 -.020 -.019
(.004) (.004) (.004)
Population Growth -.717 -.683 -.658 -1.879 -1.841 -1.915
(.214) (.213) (.213) (.321) (.320) (.324)
Population Size .001 .001 .002 .018 -.006 .017
(.0008) (.0009) (.0008) (.021) (.023) (.021)
Pegged regimes (LYS) -.010 -.016
(.004) (.005)
Intermediate regimes (LYS) -.005 -.001
(.003) (.003)
Pegged regimes (RR) -.009 -.030
(.004) (.007)
Intermediate regimes (RR) -.004 -.018
(.003) (.007)
Pegged regimes (BORA) -.007
(.004) (.005)
Intermediate regimes (BORA) -.002 -.004
(.003) (.004)
Fixed Eects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 532 532 532 532 532 532
R2 .165 .161 .157 .207 .215 .193
F-statistic 10.327 9.992 9.719 14.407 15.136 13.271
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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All Countries Emerging Markets Advanced Countries
LYS RR BORA LYS RR BORA LYS RR BORA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ination .009 .010 .010 .016 .016 .015 .058 .060 .059
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.034) (.034) (.033)
Terms of Trade Growth -.009 -.009 -.009 .006 .005 .006 -.085 -.087 -.086
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.010) (.009) (.009) (.043) (.043) (.044)
M2/Reserves -.011 -.010 -.010 .019 .015 .015 -.012 -.009 -.014
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.017) (.016) (.016) (.013) (.013) (.012)
GDP per Capita -.028 -.027 -.031 -.038 -.042 -.035 .051 .054 .048
(.008) (.009) (.009) (.025) (.025) (.026) (.024) (.025) (.024)
GDP per Capita Growth -.046 -.045 -.043 -.080 -.084 -.080 -.161 -.161 -.164
(.011) (.011) (.011) (.020) (.020) (.020) (.075) (.075) (.075)
Domestic Credit Growth -.0006 -.0007 -.0007 -.002 -.0009 -.002 -.044 -.045 -.038
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.017) (.017) (.017)
Domestic Credit/GDP .007 .008 .008 .010 .010 .010 .005 .005 .003
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Foreign Liabilities/Foreign Assets .0002 .0002 .0002 .0003 .0003 .0003 -.001 -.001 -.002
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Net Capital Flows/GDP -.008 -.008 -.007 -.005 -.005 -.003 .068 .071 .078
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.046) (.046) (.046)
Pegged regimes (LYS) -.241 -.570
(.153) (.400)
Intermediate regimes (LYS) -.148 -.285 -.048
(.109) (.180) (.364)
Pegged regimes (RR) .032 .332
(.206) (.502)
Intermediate regimes (RR) .107 .443 .122
(.178) (.447) (.425)
Pegged regimes (BORA) -.296 -.507
(.161) (.441)
Intermediate regimes (BORA) -.249 .003 -.635
(.132) (.269) (.354)
Observations 1526 1526 1526 374 374 374 347 346 347
Notes: Banking crises are identied as in Laeven and Valencia (2008). Standard Errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote
signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All the explanatory variables are lagged one period. Intermediate Regime
is dropped from the models of advanced countries because its lack of variation.
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